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Abstract
In recent years, China has sought to extend its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
from Central Asia and Southeast Asia to Africa. This article argues that Chinese 
ofﬁcials, aided by Chinese maritime archaeologists, journalists and researchers, 
have used discourses of heritage and history as a form of soft padding to justify 
China's infrastructure projects in Africa. Zheng He, a Ming dynasty admiral, 
who had allegedly visited East Africa in four of his seven famous voyages across 
the Indian Ocean, is particularly important in China's narrative of its historical 
relations with Africa. The details of Zheng He's engagement with Africa remain 
contested by historians, especially those in Western academia. The Chinese 
government thus supports 'sub-initiatives' of heritage and history construc-
tion, namely maritime archaeology, travel journalism and student fellowships, 
to substantiate the legacy of Zheng He in Africa. By suggesting that China and 
Africa also share the legacy of having been exploited, humiliated and victim-
ized by European colonial powers, Chinese intellectuals have fashioned the BRI 
into an anti-imperialist discourse for acceptance by their African counterparts.
Keywords: Africa, anti-imperialism, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), colonial-
ism, heritage, history, Zheng He
Introduction 
In September 2014, China launched the 'Silk Road Economic Belt' initia-
tive, which involved massive Chinese-subsidized infrastructure projects 
in Central Asia that would integrate the region's national economies 
and create new opportunities for economic development. A month 
later, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the Southeast Asian 
version of the initiative, the 'Maritime Silk Road', which he suggested 
was inspired by Zheng He (1371–1433), a Ming dynasty admiral who 
led a 'Treasure Fleet' of approximately 300 ships manned by 27,000 
men on seven voyages to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In 
November 2014, the Chinese government announced that it would form 
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the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); it began operations in 
January 2016 and offers a potential alternative to the World Bank for 
the ﬁnancing of construction of ports, railways, roads and industrial 
parks in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. As observers and analysts 
suggest, the realization of these initiatives, collectively known as 'One 
Belt One Road' or 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), intend to transform 
China from a regional power into a major player in world affairs (Yu 
2017: 353–368).
While some countries welcomed China's pledge to invest in their 
infrastructure and forge stronger economic links, others were less san-
guine about the BRI. The substantial loans that governments might take 
from the AIIB and Chinese banks to build infrastructure would put their 
countries in debt and surrender national economies to Chinese control. 
Through the BRI and other forms of expansionism, journalist Howard 
W. French suggests, the ideals of tianxia, a Sinocentric concept that posits 
China's 'natural' dominion over everything under heaven, are being put 
into effect. According to French (2018: 56), this means 
building up dependency on China among its smaller neighbours, the better 
to dominate them peacefully, as much as possible … [in order to] elicit 
admiration, or even awe from China's neighbours, but also to generate a 
kind of fatalism or resignation about the futility of trying to defy it.
Following Xi Jinping's speeches, many bilateral projects between 
China and countries lying along the Belt and Road, pre-existing and 
otherwise, have been swept into China's BRI. If tianxia was about link-
ing purportedly 'barbaric' peoples under the embrace and orbit of the 
Chinese civilization, then the BRI was about linking economically less-
developed countries under the leadership of China, the most successful 
developing nation of today. Xi Jinping has declared that China should 
lead economic globalization. However, as political scientist William Case 
(2018) suggests, China promotes globalization on its own terms, which 
are based on economic outwardness, not openness. Tens of thousands 
of state-owned Chinese enterprises that control the major domestic 
industries such as banking, energy, ﬁnance, telecommunications and 
transport (especially high-speed rail) now aim, in mercantilist manner, 
to dominate these industries in the global economy. As Case (2018: 
17–18) puts it, '[t]he Middle Kingdom seeks again to dominate all un-
der heaven'. Anxious diplomats and politicians have regarded China's 
BRI as 'a master-plan aimed at turning Eurasian nations into tributary 
states, dependent on Chinese capital, crisscrossed with Chinese-owned 
railways, pipelines and roads, and increasingly bound by Chinese rules 
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governing everything from trade to cyber-security' (The Economist 2018). 
Eager to export their experience in transforming China through dams, 
roads and high-speed rail, Chinese ﬁrms have secured contracts with 
governments on the Belt and Road. Host or recipient governments have 
taken out destabilizing loans (many of which represent a substantial 
part of their national GDP and which charge commercial interest rates) 
from state-owned Chinese banks to pay these Chinese ﬁrms and their 
Chinese workers who staff the infrastructure projects.
It seems, then, that China is currently 'a nation on a civilizational 
march, one driven by its deep sense of its historical place in the world 
and the entitlement this brings it' (French 2018: 283). But the link between 
the BRI and China's past, especially its history of tributary relations with 
the polities of Southeast Asia and beyond, is usually implied rather than 
proven in the existing analyses of China's rise as a global power. More-
over, while it is easy for China to strike a sense of afﬁnity with Central 
Asia and Southeast Asia by highlighting either the frequency of trade 
in the past or the existence of a huge Chinese diaspora in the present, it 
is difﬁcult to do so with Africa, which barely appears in Chinese court 
annals and other extant writings.
This article examines China's attempts to establish a historical link 
with Africa through maritime archaeology and travel journalism in 
order to discursively extend the Maritime Silk Road to that continent. 
By excavating shipwrecks off East Asian coasts and tracing the foot-
steps of Zheng He in Africa, the Chinese government has mobilized 
archaeologists and journalists in highlighting what it perceives as 
continuities and similarities between Zheng He's voyages of the past 
and the extended Maritime Silk Road initiative of the present. Given a 
general but powerful backlash in developing countries regarding the 
cronyism, national debts, loss of local ownership and environmental 
ruin that have accompanied Chinese investments, China has required 
soft paddings such as history or historical precedents of friendship to 
justify its global initiatives as not being self-serving and to assure that 
they would, as its version of history tells us, beneﬁt from Chinese be-
nevolence and peaceful rise. 
In the case of Africa and Southeast Asia, the Maritime Silk Road 
marks a return to China's tributary system of the ﬁfteenth to nineteenth 
centuries, when its emperors offered largesse to their vassal kings and 
envoys. For China, it does not matter that African polities (speciﬁcally 
those in East Africa) paid tribute to the Chinese only in the early ﬁfteenth 
century, at the sight and most likely coercion of Zheng He's armada 
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(in fact, after the voyages ceased, African missions terminated). What 
matters is that Zheng He was, in China's idealization, an ambassador 
of friendship who had connected Africans with the Chinese, who had 
not and never would abuse China's might to exploit or colonize Africa 
in the way Europeans did, as suggested by the 'historical' record.
A word is in order regarding the methodological approach to this 
article. Undoubtedly, qualitative interviews with Chinese researchers 
involved in substantiating the legacy of Zheng He in Africa and fash-
ioning the BRI into an anti-imperialist discourse would be useful. But 
the article is primarily concerned with what kind of narratives were 
constructed rather than how they came to be, as well as with why they 
mattered in Sino-African relations. An analysis of empirical data such 
as books, newspaper articles and travel writings endorsed or sponsored 
for publication by the Chinese government can thus demonstrate ad-
equately and explicitly that China's attempts to connect with Africa 
through Zheng He are part of its broader BRI strategy.
In Search of a Shipwreck
As Don D. Fowler (1987) famously noted, archaeology has often been 
put to political use, particularly by nationalists. Why this is so and how 
it has been politically used depends on the context or nation, but basic 
reasons include the highly institutional or organizational structure of 
archaeological practice, which involves teams of diversely specialized 
personnel, and the discipline's scale of operations and hence its heavy 
reliance on the state's infrastructural bases of support, such as grants, 
museums and universities. Archaeology does not yield objects of com-
mercial value. As 'national treasures' and properties of the state, items 
uncovered by archaeologists could not be auctioned or sold on the open 
market. Therefore, for archaeologists and their prohibitively expensive 
and extremely technical projects, state approval and sponsorship might 
be the only recourse. 
Archaeology holds great allure for the nation-state. In China, archae-
ologists have been able to ﬁnd the scientiﬁc proof political leaders need 
to determine the prehistory of their nation – the longer, the better – as 
with the Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronological Project, which has rejected 
scholarly consensus and controversially traced Chinese history back 
ﬁve thousand years (Shaughnessy 2009: 15–28). Artefacts and materials 
unearthed on archaeological sites have been exhibited at national and 
provincial museums, testifying to China's glorious past as a civiliza-
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tion and alluding to the successful integration of cultures and peoples 
across China. Chinese archaeologists have secured funds from both 
state and regional agencies by accommodating the different agendas 
of their sponsors – the central government seeks political legitimacy 
by compiling the histories and archaeological ﬁndings of previous 
dynasties and regimes, while the provincial governments crave greater 
central patronage and seek to assuage local pride (von Falkenhauser 
1995: 198–217).
Under the impetus of nationalism, as Bruce G. Trigger (1995: 269) 
explains, archaeology has thus 'abandoned a primary focus on evolu-
tion and concentrated on interpreting the archaeological record as the 
history of speciﬁc peoples', resulting in the development of what might 
be called 'culture-historical archaeology'. According to Trigger, cultural-
historical archaeology usually takes the form of identifying a people 
with a succession of archaeological cultures leading into the remote past 
– whose existence, I would add, has been inadequately proven by textual 
evidence – and drawing attention to the achievements of these cultures. 
The Ming annals and the records by Zheng He's companion Ma Huan 
(c. 1380–1460) are China's strongest evidence of historical intercourse with 
Africa, but they do not reveal deep, more intimate exchanges between 
the peoples of Africa and China. Nevertheless, searching for shipwrecks 
(i.e., wrecks of ships that purportedly ferried goods and people between 
Africa and China) off the coast of East Africa was a part of China's 'suc-
cession of archaeological cultures'. China's interest in these shipwrecks 
and old artefacts stems from the wish for identiﬁcation. While Chinese 
archaeologists might not know the names of the people of the past, they 
continue to regard them as 'Africans' or 'Chinese' and present their ﬁnd-
ings as indisputable truth, inventorying unearthed artefacts to connect 
them to the 'correct' textual information, to events and persons known 
from literary sources. Chinese archaeologists also seek to connect names 
to African sites and to localize history, 'embedding the narratives of the 
literary sources in the local landscape' (Eriksen 2014: 37). They do not 
challenge the ofﬁcial Chinese narratives of historical links between China 
and Africa. Rather, they work to conﬁrm what the sanctioned Chinese 
'histories' already tell. Their archaeological reconstruction aims to recover 
events, names and persons, not dispute them.
In August 2010, a team of Chinese archaeologists went to Kenya to 
search for an ancient sunken ship believed to have been part of Zheng 
He's ﬂeets. Kenyans on Lamu Island of the Lamu Archipelago had 
reportedly discovered ceramic shards dated from the Ming dynasty 
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(1368–1644), which inspired the trip. The Chinese government secured 
the cooperation of Kenya and commenced a three-year sponsorship 
of the archaeological project, which had cost US$3 million as of 2013 
(Sina.com 2010). Under China's agreement with Kenya, Chinese ar-
chaeologists and scientists could cooperate with the National Museums 
of Kenya in surveying and excavating Kenya's seabed. The Chinese 
archaeological team also tested the DNA of Kenyans on Lamu Island, 
some of whom supposedly possessed Chinese features. The Chinese 
also conducted interviews and compiled oral histories to verify if they 
were descendants of Zheng He's followers who had swum ashore from 
the sinking ship and settled on the island (Sina.com 2010).
In December 2010, China's Ministry of Commerce sponsored a follow-
up two-month mission by archaeologists of Peking University and rel-
evant units in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, the south-eastern Chinese 
provinces which were most involved in the construction and launch of 
Zheng He's ﬂeets. Together with the team that was already in Kenya, 
these archaeologists catalogued the existing Kenyan collections and 
newly excavated materials. They also helped Kenyan curators with the 
study of the Mombasa Wreck, a sunken seventeenth-century Portuguese 
frigate that carried porcelain, including Chinese pieces. Portuguese navi-
gator Vasco da Gama (c. 1460–1524) had visited Mombasa on his way 
to India. At the turn of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had built 
a fortress in Mombasa, which was successively overrun by Arab and 
British forces over the next centuries (Qin et al. 2014: 6–24; Underwater 
Archaeology Research Centre 2012: 89–99). It would be to China's credit 
to establish that Zheng He had operated in Mombasa's vicinity without 
the slightest intent to embroil it in wars and colonialism. 
Although the Chinese archaeologists and palaeontologists admit 
that they have not discovered any material evidence to prove that the 
Chinese sailors in the East African shipwreck were the men of Zheng 
He's ﬂeets, they believe that the 'Chinese' on Pate Island, the largest 
island of the Lamu Archipelago, are the descendants of Zheng He's 
crew, who married local women and formed a community of Chinese 
Africans. They have determined that the ship they are studying sank 
during the period of Zheng He's voyages (Rice 2010). In March 2013, 
American scientists discovered a Ming-dynasty coin on the Kenyan 
island of Manda, which strengthened the Chinese hypothesis that trade 
had existed between China and East Africa, at the very least through 
Arab or European intermediaries, decades before European explorers 
sailed to the Horn of Africa. The inscription Yongle Tongbao dates the 
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coin to the reign of the Yongle Emperor (1402–1424), who dispatched 
Zheng He on his voyages (Field Museum 2013).
Strong Sino-Kenyan interstate relations in recent years have made 
possible Chinese archaeological and palaeontological work, and this 
served as a conﬁdence-building project before the construction of in-
frastructure intensiﬁed after 2013, when the incumbent Kenyan presi-
dent Uhuru Kenyatta assumed ofﬁce. StarTimes, a privately owned, 
Beijing-based media and communications ﬁrm that enjoys substantial 
backing from the Chinese government, has helped Kenya transit from 
analogue to digital television and stoked the improved networks with 
pro-China broadcasts – programmes that portray an urban, fast-develop-
ing and non-controversial China. Access to international channels that 
are inclined to depict China negatively costs more than most Kenyans 
can afford. But many Kenyans continue to view China with suspicion, 
worried that China's infrastructure projects are saddling Kenya with 
crippling debt (the projects often yield far less revenue than expendi-
ture) and damaging Kenya's biodiverse national parks. Some are also 
outraged that the Chinese projects have hired more Chinese labourers, 
who enjoy preferential treatment at work, than local ones. Little trans-
parency exists, critics allege, drawing accusations of corruption. China 
ultimately aims to connect Kenya, via railroad, with Burundi, Rwanda, 
Uganda and South Sudan and improve these countries' access to ports, 
which would in turn improve trade and open markets or, as sceptics say, 
expose a signiﬁcant part of Africa to China's economic exploitation. In 
the end, the controversies are barely reported by Chinese news outlets 
in Kenya (Kaiman 2017).
As of mid-2018, China has displaced the World Bank to become 
Kenya's single largest foreign creditor. Kenyan observers worry that 
their government might surrender control of the nation's infrastructure 
and mineral wealth to China to settle its debt – the precedent of Sri 
Lanka's handing over its Hambantota Port to China looms. Even Uhuru 
Kenyatta admits that Kenya has a skewed trade relationship with China 
and has been asking the Chinese government to redress the balance 
(Masiga 2018). Kenyan journalists have referred to China as Shylock in 
Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, demanding 'no less than a pound of 
ﬂesh from any country that is unable to repay its debts' (Kilonzo 2018). 
The projects for which Kenya borrowed might not be able to ﬁnance 
its debt obligations to China, which has now become Kenya's 'biggest 
shareholder', accounting for 72 per cent of Kenya's bilateral debt by the 
end of March 2018 (Karugu 2018). But Chinese ofﬁcials have maintained 
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that China is merely building up Kenya's capacity and transferring skills 
to Kenya's labour market (Kivuva 2018). For its part, Kenya plans to 
establish, with Chinese aid, a network of marine museums across the 
country to help boost tourism. The museums, which are to remain un-
derwater due to the high cost of preserving archaeological artefacts on 
land, will be used to collect, preserve and display Kenya's underwater 
cultural heritage – the Chinese shipwreck, albeit heavily publicized, 
is only one of 30 wrecks discovered off the Kenyan coast in the Indian 
Ocean (Xinhuanet.com 2018).
For China, then, underwater cultural heritage is crucial to the BRI 
because it provides an emotive connection between China and East 
African nations such as Kenya, albeit one that is perhaps more ad-
vantageous to China. In 1987, China established its ﬁrst underwater 
archaeology organization. In 1989, it promulgated the Regulations of 
the PRC Concerning the Administration of the Work for Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Relics. These regulations allow the Chinese gov-
ernment to claim ownership of all the cultural relics 'of Chinese origin' 
outside Chinese territorial waters (Guo 2017: 533; Jing 2019: 111–112).1 
The renewed signiﬁcance of underwater cultural heritage vis-à-vis the 
BRI thus justiﬁes the existing administrative mechanisms for protect-
ing all forms of cultural heritage both within and outside China. It 
also bolsters the coordination between the central government and the 
provincial and county-level agencies in protecting underwater cultural 
heritage under Chinese jurisdiction. 
Ultimately, the Chinese government seeks to promote understanding 
and cultural exchange with other countries through maritime archaeol-
ogy – a scientiﬁc, 'objective' way to establish informal, friendly relations 
outside commercial realpolitik (Jing 2019: 756–764). In its pursuit of a 
strategy of underwater cultural heritage with Kenya, which has not 
enacted any form of legal authority over sunken relics or vessels in 
Kenyan territorial waters, China plays the role of cultural custodian, 
responsible for excavating artefacts from the sea and then preserving 
them in Kenyan museums. For China, the origins, rather than owner-
ship, of these relics or vessels is crucial to its project of establishing a 
link between China and Africa through the legacy of Zheng He. But 
the approach of underwater cultural heritage is an added beneﬁt, ap-
plicable to only a handful of East African nations such as Kenya. China 
has thus adopted a more dominant narrative as part of its BRI rhetoric 
– the dominance and humiliation of both China and especially Africa 
by European colonial powers.
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In Search of a Hero
As the historian Don J. Wyatt (2010) suggests, the Chinese knew of 
Africa only indirectly and largely through intermediaries such as the 
Arabs, who visited Africa's eastern coastline and offshore islands as 
early as the tenth century. According to extant textual evidence, 'we 
are truly challenged to ﬁnd mention of any deﬁnite place on the Afri-
can continent in a Chinese source prior to the mid-ninth century C.E.' 
(Wyatt 2010: 84). However, China, or Chinese culture, remains com-
mitted to the documentary description of its relations with Africa, as 
its maritime archaeological projects have made known. As there is no 
record of Chinese ships sailing to Africa prior to the ﬁfteenth century, 
Zheng He becomes important in China's narrative of its premodern self 
in relation to Africa.
Born in modern-day Yunnan Province, Zheng He was an ethnic Mus-
lim Hui who was captured by the Ming army during its conquest of the 
province. As the son of a leading member of the resistance against Ming 
forces, Zheng He was subjected to castration. He accepted his punish-
ment without malice and remained loyal to the Ming court throughout 
his life. The Yongle Emperor recognized his talent for leadership and 
dispatched him on several military campaigns. Zheng He's victories 
earned him an imperially bestowed surname and the rank of director-
in-chief of the Directorate of Palace Eunuchs. When the Yongle Emperor 
sanctioned the 'celestial voyages' of Treasure Fleets to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the realm over which he as the Chinese sovereign ruled, he 
chose Zheng He to command the expeditions – an ultimately 'inner-court' 
initiative outside the bureaucracy's intervention – because he believed 
that the eunuch's leadership could afford him maximum latitude over 
the setting of objectives and the allocation of resources. Zheng He was 
a devout Muslim who could speak ﬂuent Arabic and deal adroitly with 
the predominantly Islamic polities that he was expected to visit during 
his voyages. Furthermore, as the Director of Palace Eunuchs, he was re-
sponsible for palace construction and was familiar with civil engineering 
and the manufacture of ships and weapons (Wyatt 2010: 93–97).
For contemporary China and the Chinese, Zheng He's encounter with 
'Africa' was the ﬁrst Chinese exposure to and therefore conﬁrmation of 
sightings of 'Africans'. However, the elevation of Ming dynastic prestige 
among known tributary partners remained Zheng He's key objective; 
his exploration of unknown territories such as Africa was never a top 
priority. This is similar to the BRI, which, at least for the time being, 
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remains focused on Central Asia and Southeast Asia; Africa is a possible 
extension point for the BRI in the long run, subject to the success of the 
initiative on the Central and Southeast Asia fronts. Like the fables that 
emerged not long after Zheng He's voyages ceased, present-day ofﬁcial 
Chinese narratives continue to encourage readers to believe that the ad-
miral was universally welcomed at every port of call – whether Zheng 
He visited Africa intentionally or fortuitously remains uncertain. These 
narratives dismiss the acts of violence committed by Zheng He as those 
against 'pirates' and 'recalcitrant' kings (Wade 2005: 37–58).
In support of ofﬁcial Chinese narratives, Chinese journalists have 
produced several travelogues and special reports documenting their 
encounters in Africa. Li Xinfeng, a journalist based in Africa for eight 
years for the Chinese government's organ People's Daily (Renmin ribao), 
is particularly famous for his extensive reportage on the continent. For 
his books on Sino-African relations and his own trips across Africa, he 
became a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
a think tank afﬁliated with China's State Council. CASS has sponsored 
the translation of his books into English for sale in Africa, and Chinese 
dignitaries such as former premier Wen Jiabao have penned calligraphy 
or written prefaces for the books. Li Xinfeng has dedicated himself to 
the anthropological and ethnographical study of Africa, having con-
ducted several year-long ﬁeldtrips to 'trace the footsteps of Zheng He 
in Africa' (Feizhou taxun Zheng He lu) and, of particular interest to this 
article, to examine the relationship between 'Zheng He and Africa' 
(Zheng He yu Feizhou).
In Zheng He yu Feizhou, Li Xinfeng (2012) explains the historical 
signiﬁcance of Zheng He's voyages to Africa. By suggesting that the 
ﬁrst instance of Chinese migration to Africa occurred in modern-day 
Kenya, where some of Zheng He's crew settled after being shipwrecked, 
rather than Mauritius, where Chinese coolies began working in planta-
tions in the eighteenth century, Li Xinfeng argues that the Chinese had 
'discovered' Africa before the Europeans. Chinese sources, Li Xinfeng 
writes, recorded the events, persons and places of Africa, countering 
the Hegelian claim that the Africans have no history.2 Li Xinfeng (2012: 
377–378) has subscribed to the 'myth of continents' and somewhat tele-
ologically presupposed the existence of ﬁxed boundaries and categories 
such as 'Africa', 'China', 'Africans' and 'Chinese' – a live example of 
how cultural assumptions and national identity have reinforced the 
misconceived geographical divisions that govern the way people have 
perceived the world.3
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Tracing the footsteps of Zheng He in Africa, Li Xinfeng continues, 
could provide a 'historical basis' (lishi genju) and 'theoretical support' 
(lilun zhichi) for Africa's 'Look East' policy. Li Xinfeng insists that China's 
maritime trade with Africa through Zheng He's voyages was conducted 
based on friendship and mutual beneﬁt, several centuries before the 
European exploitation of African people and resources via imperial-
ism. He posits that contemporary China's BRI sustains the tradition of 
Ming China's 'equal relationship' (pingdeng guanxi) with Africa (Li 2012: 
378–380). As a Muslim accompanied by Arab interpreters, Li Xinfeng 
elaborates, Zheng He was sensitive to the cultures he encountered in 
Africa and the Middle East. That his crew could assimilate into African 
societies after being shipwrecked shows that the Chinese truly respect 
and value foreign cultures (Li 2012: 382–383). According to Li Xinfeng, 
during the Ming dynasty when Zheng He sailed across the Indian Ocean 
to Africa, China held a third of the world's wealth. But Zheng He's mas-
sive ﬂeets did not colonize foreign lands or subdue foreign peoples. 
Neither did they enslave Africans nor threaten any polity with force. 
Rather, Zheng He cultivated friendships and expanded trade between 
China and other nations, differentiating China's approach from the 
reality of European imperialism in Africa. In Li Xinfeng's view, China's 
rise would not destroy cultures, nations and peoples, as Zheng He well 
exempliﬁed (Li 2012: 383–385). 
However, such a narrative has obscured not only Zheng He's instances 
of violence, but also Ming China's aggression towards Vietnam and 
Qing China's military expansion into northwestern and southwestern 
China, where economic exploitation, settler colonialism and massacres 
occurred.4 If contemporary China were to inherit the territories previously 
held by Qing China, then it should acknowledge the atrocities that Qing 
armies committed in Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan.
Li Xinfeng also denies the existence of a 'China threat'. For him, China 
suffered more than a century of national humiliation at the hands of 
Western imperialism from the Opium War (1839–1842) to the found-
ing of the People's Republic of China in 1949. China is thus able to 
understand the negative impact of Western imperialism on Africa. Li 
Xinfeng maintains that China's contracts and economic deals with Afri-
can nations are 'open and transparent' (gongkai touming). Moreover, he 
continues, China imports less oil – one of Africa's most valuable exports 
– from Africa than Europe and the United States. The African leaders 
and politicians he has interviewed, he writes, agree that China has not 
coerced or exploited the continent. For Li Xinfeng, China's construction 
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of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway in the 1970s, which lifted landlocked 
Zambia's economic dependence on apartheid Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and 
South Africa, was a clear example of China's unconditional assistance to 
developing countries and respect for other nations' sovereignty during 
the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Advocates of the 'China threat' narrative, many of whom are Ameri-
cans and Europeans, are judging China's foreign aid and BRI based on 
their own historical experience of imperialism, Li Xinfeng argues. In 
fact, he elaborates, Western nations are alarmed at China's rise because 
China could eliminate Africa's reliance on the West for economic assist-
ance and export markets and, hence, rescue the continent from Western 
neo-imperialism. By restricting and denying China an active and con-
structive role in African affairs, he suggests, Western nations are trying 
to protect their interests in Africa and maintain their dominance of the 
world (Li 2012: 387–392).
Li Xinfeng defends his thesis of China's 'peaceful diplomacy' (heping 
waijiao) by consulting the Ming annals and imperial pronouncements, 
which urged Zheng He to exercise restraint and not strive for unilateral 
advantage in his conduct of relations with foreign rulers. The descend-
ants of Zheng He's crew in Kenya inherited his humility and respect for 
local societies. They thus helped lay the foundation for positive Sino-
African relations to develop – a 'precious historical legacy' (baogui de lishi 
yichan) (Li 2012: 393–398). Unlike most historians, Li Xinfeng argues that 
Ming China prioritized its relations with African polities, as suggested 
by Zheng He's four personal visits to East Africa.5
To be sure, Li Xinfeng is not the ﬁrst person to associate contempo-
rary Sino-African relations with Zheng He's voyages. In 1964, when 
former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) visited East Africa, 
he declared Zheng He a great explorer who had contributed substan-
tially to Sino-African friendship. In the 2000s, Chinese leaders such as 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made several references to Zheng He, and 
in 2005, the Chinese government celebrated the 600th anniversary of 
Zheng He's voyages. As former CASS President Wang Weiguang (2012: 
4–5) suggests, Chinese leaders have in recent years funded the study 
of Africa and the publicity of Zheng He, seeing them as inseparable. 
State-sponsored research and publications on Africa have 'rediscovered' 
Zheng He as a pioneer of Sino-African relations.
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In Search of a Descendant
Li Xinfeng spent six years, from 1999 to 2005, tracing the footsteps of 
Zheng He in Africa, based on what he had gathered from extant Chinese 
sources. One of his unexpected 'discoveries' was a Kenyan girl named 
Mwamaka Sharifu from Lamu Island. In 1999, New York Times journal-
ist Nicholas D. Kristof (2019) met several elderly men on the Kenyan 
island of Pate who told him that they were descendants of shipwrecked 
Chinese sailors. Hot on Kristof's heels, Li Xinfeng encountered many 
Kenyans who claimed ancestry from Zheng He's crew and had ancestral 
tombs that faced northeast, towards China.
But Sharifu's story attracted the most attention. In 2002, Chinese re-
searchers ran a DNA test on Sharifu and her family, who were among 
the ﬁrst Kenyans interviewed for their alleged links with Zheng He's 
crew. The researchers identiﬁed six people on Lamu (the island had 
7,500 people) as Chinese descendants. One of them was Sharifu, who 
was highly publicized by Li Xinfeng's newspaper reports and became 
China's poster girl in its attempts to strengthen ties with Africa. Born 
to a poor ﬁsherman, Sharifu could not afford a college education. In 
2004, she wrote to the Chinese embassy in Kenya, expressing her strong 
desire to pursue higher education in China (China Daily 2005). In 2005, 
in conjunction with the celebrations of the voyages of Zheng He, the 
Chinese government invited Sharifu to visit China. By then nicknamed 
'China Girl', Sharifu toured Taicang City in Jiangsu Province, where her 
ancestors supposedly came from. She also attended the commemorative 
events that marked Zheng He's travels. She was then offered a scholar-
ship, awarded by the Chinese government, to study traditional Chinese 
medicine at the Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs [China]).
The Chinese government's sponsorship of Sharifu's education laid 
the foundation for its involvement in Kenya's 'Beyond Zero' initiative. 
Spearheaded by the First Lady Margaret Kenyatta, Beyond Zero aims at 
alleviating the health problems of mothers and children and improving 
the livelihood of women in Kenya. Having received a tertiary education 
in medicine, Sharifu provided an example of how China could assist the 
initiative. Since 2017, the Chinese government has pledged to support 
Kenya's initiative by offering bursaries and full scholarships to disad-
vantaged Kenyan girls to study medicine and other subjects at Chinese 
universities. Chinese ofﬁcials have also trained a group of Kenyan 
women to operate or serve as attendants on the new standard-gauge 
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railway trains, which are one of China's many infrastructure projects 
in Kenya. (Executive Ofﬁce of the President [Kenya]).
If the DNA tests were accurate, then Sharifu and the handful of Ken-
yans identiﬁed by Li Xinfeng and Chinese researchers as 'Chinese' had 
succeeded, with ofﬁcial Chinese and Kenyan endorsement, in creating 
for themselves a diasporic identity and a sense of historical continuity 
by linking 'ancestral' and 'actual' migrations, similar to what the Soninke 
people of the Gambia have done (Gaibazzi 2012: 30). If Li Xinfeng had 
traced the footsteps of Zheng He in Africa, then Sharifu had allowed 
Zheng He's story to come full circle by 'returning' to China. Unlike 
artefacts or relics uncovered by maritime archaeology, Sharifu was a 
living or organic testimony to China's claim that Africa's relationship 
with China was longer, friendlier and far more mutually advantageous 
than that with European powers, which had exploited, humiliated and 
victimized their African colonies for their own beneﬁt.
Conclusion
In late July 2018, Xi Jinping visited four African countries – Senegal, 
Rwanda, South Africa and Mauritius. He oversaw the signing of BRI 
cooperation agreements during his tour. With Senegal, which enjoys a 
'unique geographical location', China's BRI expanded into West Africa. 
The BRI had focused more on East Africa, which, thanks to Zheng He's 
voyages, forms a more 'natural geographic link' with the Maritime Silk 
Road stretching from East Asia westward through the Indian Ocean 
(Tiezzi 2018). Without this link, China must seek other commonalities 
and explanations for its cooperation with West Africa; heritage and 
history are thus simply one of many discursive tools – albeit one that is 
preferred by Chinese ofﬁcials – at its disposal. For them, a shared his-
tory in humiliation at the hands of Western imperialism 'organically' 
binds China with its African compatriots (Wang 2012).
The discourse of Chinese archaeologists, historians and journalists 
has reinforced the Chinese government's rhetoric that a peaceful and 
powerful China, as in the past, will contribute to Africa's prosperity and 
future economic growth. China's quest to extend its BRI into Africa has 
manifested itself in its maritime archaeological projects off the exten-
sive East African coast, the sponsorship of research and publications 
on Africa and the search for descendants of Zheng He's crew in Kenya. 
China's 'discoveries' of Chinese shipwrecks, the legacy of Zheng He 
and the revelation of 'China Girl' historically justify its BRI in Africa; it 
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remains to be seen whether they can convince the African public that 
China's infrastructure projects, as suggested by the ofﬁcial Chinese nar-
rative, are truly compatible with their nations' needs.
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NOTES
1.  The deﬁnition of 'of Chinese origin' is vague; it could mean 'China as its ﬂag state', 
'Chinese ports as its departing port', 'its cargos of Chinese origin' or 'ship built in 
China'. See Guo (2017: 533).
2. Li Xinfeng's claim is exaggerated, however, because, as previously mentioned, 
Chinese accounts of Africa were sketchy, at least prior to the ninth century.
3.  For more on the myth of continents, see Lewis and Wigen (1997).
4.  The 'New Qing' histories are particularly relevant. See, for example, Hostetler (2001); 
Perdue (2005); Giersch (2006); and Dai (2009).
5.  Whether Zheng He personally visited Africa remains contested by historians, as Li 
Xinfeng (2012: 399–400) himself has conceded.
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